DOES THE PEER PRESSURE POSITION AND SELF-STATEMENT MECHANISMS REDUCE BEHAVIOR TO CREATE BUDGET SLACKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH

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dc.contributor.authorApriwandi
dc.contributor.authorShaleh, Khairul
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-16T00:15:56Z
dc.date.available2021-02-16T00:15:56Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.description.abstractThe budgeting system has historically played a role in management control. However, recently it has become the subject of considerable criticism from researchers. Budgeting often results in dysfunctional behavior, spending a lot of management time adapting in an uncertain environment. This study aims to investigate dysfunctional behavior that is reflected in the creation of budgetary slack. Several previous studies have considered budgetary slack due to pressure from the authorities, and subordinates have no choice to take dysfunctional actions. We focus on mitigating or reducing budgetary slack through peer pressure and selfdisclosure mechanisms. One hundred and thirty-three master students volunteered to participate in the experiment, with a 2x2x2 within-subject design. In this paper, we present experimental findings that provide evidence that managers who are instructed to create budgetary slack can be reduced through peer pressure mechanisms and self-statements. Managers who obey the leadership's orders to create budgetary slack tend to be lower when signing self-statements than managers who do not sign self-statements. Another evidence is that budgetary slack can be minimized by peer pressure, and peer pressure interactions can reduce compliance pressure and budgetary slack. Peer pressure and self-statement mechanisms have been shown to moderate the relationship between compliance pressure and budgetary slack. These findings suggest that social norm theory can explain that the dysfunctional or opportunistic behavior of managers during the budgeting process can be controlled by peer pressure mechanisms and self-statements. Therefore, companies need to pay more attention to peer pressure and self-statement as management control tools, especially regarding budgeting.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0038-111X
dc.identifier.urihttp://repository.widyatama.ac.id/xmlui/handle/123456789/12526
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSolid State Technology Volume: 63 Issue: 3en_US
dc.subjectPeer Pressureen_US
dc.subjectSelf-Statementen_US
dc.subjectBudgetary Slacken_US
dc.titleDOES THE PEER PRESSURE POSITION AND SELF-STATEMENT MECHANISMS REDUCE BEHAVIOR TO CREATE BUDGET SLACKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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